



VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

OPAR VIS –Targeting Presentation – Pre D7

FRIENDLY SITUATION

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND (LCC)

IV Corps:

- 55th Mechanized Division has secured HATAY and have moved forward battalions to screening positions along the FLOT
- - 56th Armor Division has its forward elements at the southern outskirt of Gaziantep. 56th is conducting its offensive to capture Gazientiep and free Turkish territory

Turkish Local Forces:

- Turkish 33rd Brigade have withdrawn their frontline forces to the city (N37 09.000 E038 48.000) in order to set up defenses to prevent Syrian forces to continue to capture the airfield at Sanliurfa.
- Turkish local forces are in static defensive positions and are not in a position to assume offensive operations.
- Turkish local forces consist of BTR-80 and M-113s vehicles
- Turkish local forces are reinforced with coalition JTACs to support with CAS to defend against Syrian attacks. OPAR 2 VIS —Targeting Figure 2 CILOLIUII FILE 27



FRIENDLY SITUATION

MARITIME COMPONENT COMMAND (MCC)

- **CSG-1** continues to support the mission from CSG-1 operations box (same as D5)
- **SAG-1** have been directed to head west in the Mediterranean due to sinking of a ship carrying ordnance for JFACC

FRIENDLY SITUATION

Special Operations Component Command (SOCC)

SOF teams are standing by to support with reconnaissance as required and requested by JFACC/VIS.

- SOF team inserted to observe and report at: 922nd SCUD regiment Base (SYTGT003)
- SOF team inserted to observe and report at: South Aleppo Rocket Fuel factory (SYTGT137)
- SOF team inserted to observe and report at: Tartus (SYTGT056)

SOF teams are also on standby to conduct counter terrorism missions and counter insurgency operations.

INVENTORY

Ordnance list not updated yet

- We are still low on all GPS guided munitions, something that will affect operations for D7
- Pilots will be tasked with SCLs from D7 onwards
- Pilots will be requested to limit the use of external fuel tanks whenever possible as JFACC will try to acquire additional numbers
- JFC has reported a small batch of PGMs will be available for D7, amount and types are as of yet unknown
- JFACC is finalizing the ordnance list for phase 2 and onwards

JFC Guidance

Guidance from JFC

Directions and Guidance or orders received with guidance

- Priority of effort is on establishing Air Superiority in support of LCC and set conditions for own operations:
- Start shaping for phase 2 in the operation (Create permissive environment)
- •Continue support to LCC
- •JFC is working with political leaders to get an agreement to use airbases in Iraq during parts of phase 2. Airbases in question are H3, H3 Northwest. H3 Southwest. What can we achieve by using these bases?
- What assets to relocate
- •JFACC will need to work with the 176th to establish operating procedures and documents
- •A parallel effort is being made to ensure overflight rights over Lebanon or Israel for any carrier-based aircraft.

No time-estimate, but points 2 and 3 above will not happen until Phase 2 at the earliest!

JFACC Status

During D6, JFACC supported the LCC on the battlefield to help LCC achieve its objectives.

Other missions were to strike SCC East and gather intel IVO Shayrat and Tiyas Airbases. Both missions failed.

JFACC expects to continue supporting this effort on D7 (3.2.2.1):

- •Air Requests from LCC (Pending)
- •SCAR/AR ivo Minakh and Hatay in order to further attrit enemy forces in the region

JFACC is expecting taskings to support continued air superiority over Turkey (3.2.4.1 3.2.4.2):

- Strike SCC East
- •Execute operations to shape the environment to strike Shayrat, Tiyas and Palmyra ABs

JFACC is expecting to engage targets of opportunity (TSTs):

•SCUD/WMD

3.2.1 Establish Air Superiority over Turkey

3.2.1.1	Deny SyAF ability to affect operations in Turkey	
3.2.1.2	Deny Syrian IADS systems ability to affect operations in Turkey	
3.2.1.3	Deny Syrian Long-Range MLRS artillery the ability to affect operations in Turkey	

3.2.2 Defeat Syrian Forces in Turkey

3.2.2.1	Provide support for LCC in order to achieve LCC's main objectives	X
3.2.2.2	Deny Syrian 1 st and 2 nd Corps logistical support	X
3.2.2.3	Destroy C2 capabilities supporting the Syrian offensive into Turkey	X
3.2.2.4	Deny Syrian Armed Forces access into Turkey	X
3.2.2.5	Affect the Syrian will to fight by destroying vital supplies and infrastructure	X

3.2.3 Destroy Syrian WMD capabilities

3.2.3.1	Neutralize Syrian Surface-to-Surface missile regiments
3.2.3.2	Deny Syrian forces the ability to produce and store chemical weapons
3.2.3.3	Deny Syrian Armed forces the ability to research NBC WMDs

3.2.4 Establish Air Superiority over Syria

3.2.4.1	Deny Syrian IADS the ability to affect operations in Syria
3.2.4.2	Deny SyAF ability to affect operations in Syria
3.2.4.3	Deny Syrian Long-range MLRS artillery the ability to affect operations in Syria

3.2.5 Neutralize Syrian Army Offensive Capabilities

3.2.2.1	Neutralize enemy ability to coordinate attacks effectively			
3.2.2.2	Neutralize enemy ability to maneuver and attack by interdicting logistical network			
	and transport infrastructure and destroying POL sites			
3.2.2.3	Attrit enemy Armored and Artillery divisions			

JFACC Goals

JFACC has formulated short, medium and long term goals.

SHORT TERM (+/- 2 days)


- Destroy SCC East
- Shape operations to strike Shayrat, Tiyas and Palmyra ABs
- Gather intel on IADS sector South

MEDIUM GOALS (+/- 2-4 days)

- •Strike Shayrat, Tiyas and Palmyra ABs
- •Strike targets in northern Syria that support the war effort

LONG TERM GOALS (+/-4-8 days)

- Strike IADS sector South
- •Use Iraqi airbases to support missions in southern Syria








D7 Weather Report

- D7.1: Dawn, broken clouds, winds from the North-East
- D7.2: Night, clear skies, winds from the North-East
- D8.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D8.2: Dusk, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D9.1: Day, broken clouds, winds from North-East
- D9.2: Dusk, broken clouds, winds from North-East
- (i.e. two-day window with pretty good weather may become a factor from D9)

D6 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- Strikes on army HQ Buildings in Aleppo mean deployment of 5th Corps is VERY LIKELY to be delayed, along with mobilisation of 6th Corps
- Recent destruction of 1st Corps HQ, 11th Div HQ and damage to 12th DIV HQ mean further attacks by 1st Corps units are UNLIKELY over the next few days, and coordination of brigades is VERY LIKELY to be severely hampered.
- Significant attrition of 11th Mechanised Division at Gaziantep has now begun:
 - 81% of BMP-2s remain
 - 63% of tube artillery remains
 - EVEN CHANCE remaining rocket artillery is a single GRAD, or a single GRAD and 2 x SMERCH (neither observed firing D5.2)
 - SA-15s and SA-8s all destroyed. Significant numbers of SA-13 and GUNDISH remain.
- Significant attrition of 10th Armoured Division at Minakh
 - 85% of T-72s remain
 - 53% of tube artillery remains
 - Remaining rocket arty consisting of 2 x GRAD, 2 x URAGAN and 2 x SMERCH remain a significant threat and their destruction should be prioritised.
 - 2 x SA-15 and 2 x SA-8 remain in the area along with numerous SA-19 and GUNDISH.
 - Numerous recent observations of armoured formations moving north along road just west of Gaziantep. Assessed LIKELY this is a brigade preparing for a counterattack against our forces IVO Gaziantep.
- 12th Mot DIV reduced to 2 effective Bdes
 - One continues to hold Birecik Dam
 - One remains IVO Attaturk Dam, supported by 2 x GRAD, and now reinforced by detatched Bde from 10th Armour DIV
 - 2 x SA-15 remain near the damaged HQ IVO Birecik Dam
- Little attrition and little recent contact with 2nd DIV near Hatay:
 - 21st Mech DIV assessed still holding defensive positions east of Hatay (in the absence of any observations otherwise from our forces in the area)







D5 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground


- 5th Corps is a big deal!
 - 2 x Armour DIV (includes a total of 8 x SA-15)
 - 1 x Mech DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
 - 1 x Mot DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
 - Heavy Rocket Arty Regt
 - Air Defence DIV (1 x SA-6 + 2 x SA-11)
- Arrival of this Corps provides many options to the Syrians, and the new air defenses can severely impede our ability to provide air support to LCC.
- Deployment timescale expected between 4-7 days. Could consider sending SOF team to monitor activity at the base in Palmyra to give warning of movement.





D5 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

- No change in IADS situation.
- In Sector West:
 - Friendly air units continue to enjoy freedom to manoeuvre in the north of the sector and attrit any enemy SAM units that deploy here.
 - Further units remain in the south of the sector around Tartus and Homs. Indications of new units near Homs – likely at Air Defence Academy.
 - Assessed LIKELY that no backup SCC exists in this sector based on pilot observations of SAM behaviour.
- In Sector East
 - 3 x SA-3 sites degraded (loss of SR) or disabled (loss of SR and TR), plus one SA-11 disabled.
 - 2 x SA-2, 1 x SA-3, 2 x SA-6 and 1 x SA-11 remain fully operational. Only 1 x SA-2 location known for certain. SA-6 and -11 observed on D3.1 not seen since
 - Moving SA-2 may move to protect Palmyra in southeast of sector due to arrival of new MiG-29s.
- In Sector South, no changes. IADS still fully operational.







D5 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

VIS still recommends on-call SEAD as a minimum (or SEAD organic to package) for strike missions into Syrian territory due to the mobility of SA-6 and SA-11 systems (approx. 30 mins to pack up, a few hours drive within sector, 30 mins to set up — able to reposition within sector between our events).

Several IADs units assessed to be at or soon to be at the Air Defence Academy (TGT062) (SA-15s, SA-2, possible SA-6). Recommend targeting this in the next 1-2 days to slow the replacement of long range and medium range SAM units and maintain our advantage.






D5 Situation/BDA - Sea

- Nothing new to report wrt naval operations
- Remaining Syrian units are:
 - 2 x Molniya patrol boat at sea
 - 2 x Rezny frigate in Tartus

Syrian navy still presents a threat to JCTF logistics.

- Significant and growing Russian presence. Currently not known how actively they will enforce the embargo. Chinese SAG en-route but LIKELY will not arrive for some time.
- VIS recommendations remain as for D4:
 - JCTF shipping is routed to stay at least 55 nautical miles from the Lebanese coast
 - If logistics security becomes a priority, target the Molniyas and Reznys directly







D5 Enemy Situation/BDA - WMDs

- 622nd Scud Regiment (Aleppo) has moved to Alert Status 1. TELs have moved out of base and into hiding. To launch, they would need to rendezvous with a fuel truck from the storage sights at either the 622nd Base or the Rocket Fuel Factory (both in Aleppo, both under watch by SoF).
- No sign of fuel being moved from either location, therefore it is LIKELY that the fuel storage remains a critical vulnerability of the WMD system.
- Remaining Scud Regiments (both near Damascus) have moved to Alert Status 2. Able to leave base at 30 mins notice.
- SCUD test carried out during D5. It is not currently known where the fuel for this launch came from, as no activity was detected by SOF teams observing Aleppo SCUD base and the Rocket Fuel Factory. No other fuel storage known and currently assumed that some fuel trucks were not at the base when our SOF teams arrived.
- Recommend holding back 8 x GBU 31(V)3/B for short-notice strike on WMD oxidiser storage
 if needed)





D5 Enemy Situation/BDA - Air

- Air picture is largely unchanged since D4. Little contact during D5.
- Tabga appears not operational. Assessed LIKELY due to destruction of all fuel storage and without significant Syrian logistics effort will persist until D11 (low confidence!)
- Hama AB runway was also hit. VERY LIKELY Non-operational until D9.
- Attrition of another MiG-23 at Shayrat. 19 remain.
- 8 x MiG-29 observed landing at Palmyra D4.2. LIKELY these have been acquired from Russia and a new Squadron is now based at Palmyra. Another 4 aircraft likely on the way or have already arrived unobserved.
- Syria's primary airfields to obstruct JCTF air operations over the next few days are Shayrat (20 x MiG-23), Tiyas (22 x MiG-29) and Palmyra (est. 12 x MiG-29). QRA observed from both Shayrat and Tiyas when encroaching within 80NM.
- Unknown if new Palmyra sqn is night capable. Both other







D6 Enemy MLCOA

• ML COA – 24 to 72 hrs:

 Following severe attrition of army C2, and particularly 1 Corps C2, it is assessed that 1 Corps units will not commence new offensives, and brigades will be poorly coordinated.

Gaziantep

• 11 DIV attempts to defend airfield, focusing remaining tube arty on pinch-points to slow the advance and inflict losses. The primary aim is likely to be to delay JCTF forces to buy time for the 5 Corps to deploy.

Minakh


- 10 DIV Continues to hold Minakh with one brigade
- Second brigade moving north preparing to counterattack Gaziantep (assessed LIKELY that such plans will already have been made, and brigade C2 will continue to execute those orders. However, with the loss of the Corps HQ coordination with 10 DIV forces will be hampered).

Birecik/Attaturk/Sanliurfa

 12 DIV and detached armour brigade take up defensive positions and continue to stage for attack on Sanliurfa once C2 is restored.

Hatay

• 2 Corps units continue to hold defensive positions, protecting 1 Corps flank and harassing friendly forces at Hatay with GRADs.







D6 Enemy MLCOA


- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - Signs of pending invasion of Syrian territory (e.g. close to Hatay) likely to result in threats to use WMDs on CJTF forces and/or Turkish civilian targets.
 - Reconfiguration of IADS to maximise cover on key WMD infrastructure (esp. Aleppo)
 - SA-2 from Jirah redeployed to Palmyra to cover airbase and army base.
 - Airforce Assault Sqns deployed chiefly in A2A role to replace losses. CAP out of Tiyas AB, Shayrat AB and Palmyra AB.
 - Navy aims to enforce embargo, with Molniyas and Reznys aiming to stay within IADS coverage except when intelligence received about JTCF logistics shipping.
 - Syria have motivation for Russia to become more involved in the conflict and will likely look for
 opportunities to exploit ambiguity and potential for confusion. Russia can provide indirect support to
 their ally by creating ambiguous situations that make use of JCTF reluctance for conflict with Russia to
 escalate. VIS assess it is LIKELY that Russia will increase activity in the region even if not providing direct
 support in the form of attacks on JCTF forces or shipping: more flights from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and
 increased naval activity.





D6 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - 11th DIV defends Gaziantep Intl
 - 2nd Corps launch attack on Hatay with the aim of ultimately driving far enough north to endanger Incirlik AB
 - 10th DIV holds the third brigade in reserve ready for a counterattack on the 56th DIV.
 - 12th DIV holds ground IVO Birecik and Attaturk Dam to allow force to be concentrated on repelling JCTF forces. Detached armoured brigade counterattacks Gaziantep forces from the east.







D6 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - IADS units redeployed north to provide greater defence in depth and prevent easy CJTF access to strategic targets, as well as improving their air-force's prospects providing effective CAP.
 - Airforce redeploys fighter/interceptor squadrons further north to alternative airfields within IADS coverage, and spreads night-capable squadrons more evenly to avoid reliance on particular airfields.
 - Southern SCUD regiments moved to alert state 1 and deploy to hiding places. 922nd
 SCUD Regiment used to attack Incirlik and other targets with conventional warheads, disrupting ability of CJTF to project air power
 - Syrian navy exploits Russian support for embargo and absence of CJTF SAG to attack CSG with Molinyas, with Reznys providing support.
 - Syria conducts cyber-attacks on CJTF assets, causing further disruption to logistics





D6/7 Targeting Recommendations

- AR IVO Minakh in priority order:
 - Remaining SA-15s, to make permissive for A2G specialists
 - Remaining rocket arty (2 x SMERCH, 2 x URAGAN, 2 x GRAD (and accompanying SA-8s)) to limit Syrian ability to strike behind our lines
 - C2 if observed (DIV or Bde HQs NOT hospitals!), to further degrade ability to carry out coordinated or offensive actions
 - MBTs, especially if they look like they might be heading north
- Support LCC with CAS in accordance with his priorities. Main threats assessed to be:
 - Tube arty within 15km of pinch points
 - Armoured units approaching from Minakh or Birecik
- Continue to degrade IADS to allow strategic targets to be hit more easily and provide more permissive environment for CAP to operate. Specifically:
 - TGT062 (Air defence academy IVO Homs, a critical node in deploying new air defense units to replace losses)
 - SA-2 and other SAMs IVO Tabqa (to keep it vulnerable to later strikes so it stays out of the game), or any SAMs relocating to the north of their sectors
 - Units in the south of Sector West to improve access to Damascus area and the airbases that are currently operational
- If resources permit:
 - Destroy 2 Corps HQ, 21 and 22 DIV HQs and their GRADs, along with any SA-15s in that area to prevent 2 Corps from harassing or attacking our forces at Hatay
 - Further strikes on JADS elements for Shavrat/Tivas airbases ftware published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.





D6 Current TST List

• VIS recommend that SCUDs and their fuel trucks stay on the TST list at this point. No other target would be worth deviating from the planned mission to engage.





D6 Intelligence Requirements

- Full list provided in separate Excel sheet.
- New ones for D6 focus on:
 - COA for 10 DIV brigades at Minakh and Birecik/Sanliurfa

IR35		Where are the 5th Corps Divisions deploying?	D5.1
	IR35.1	Are there SA-6 or SA-11 within 50km of the FLOT? If so, where?	D5.1
	IR35.2	Are there MBTs or SA-19s located near Hatay to the south or east (apart from IVO Minakh)?	D5.1
	IR35.3	Are there BMP-2 or SA-13 located with 12th DIV near Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.4	Are there SA-8 located IVO Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.5	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Gaziantep? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.6	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Minakh? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.7	How many SA-15s are located at Birecik dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.8	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located south of Hatay? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.9	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located IVO Taftanaz? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.10	Are any SA-15s/SA-8s located within 50km of the FLOT but not IVO south of Hatay, Taftanaz, Minakh, Gaziantep or Birecik Dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.11	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Kharab Ishk?	D5.1
	IR35.12	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Tal Siman?	D5.1
	IR35.13	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Aleppo Intl?	D5.1
	IR35.14	Is any enemy rotary wing activity observed within 200km of FLOT? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.15	Is any fixed wing activity observed into or out of front-line airfields (Kharab Ishk, Aleppo Int, Kuweires, Tal Siman? These may be possible staging points for Corps or Divisions.	D5.1
	IR35.16	What military traffic is observed travelling close to SoF positions in Aleppo - esp. BRDM-2 or ARV MTLB-U BOMAN on D5, larger formations D5.2 onwards. Report strength, type and direction of travel.	D5.1
IR36		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra night-capable?	D5.1
IR37		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra engaging in CAP or QRA?	D5.1





D6 Vulnerable SYTGT

- Syrian operational targets that are currently not well protected by Syrian counter-air assets:
 - SYTGT001 Syrian Army HQ Building 1 destruction would prevent deployment or movement of Corps-sized units for 4 to 7 days, and ability to conduct an offensive using more than one Corps will be removed.
 - SYTGT002 Syrian Army HQ Building 2 destruction would delay mobilisation by 4-7 days, and cause chaos in the mobilisation and deployment of forces.
 - SYTGT003 622nd Scud Regt. Base destruction now has reduced impact as TELs are in the field, but fuel and oxidiser storage is one of only two such sites known.
 - SYTGT137 Rocket Fuel Factory destruction would prevent manufacture of more Scud fuel/oxidiser, and storage on-site is one of only two such sites known.
 - SYTGT100 Syrian Naval HQ destruction would severely impact coordination of maritime operations and reduce flow of supplies by sea, including loading oil for export, by 50%
 - SYTGT005 Syrian Navy Storage destruction would increase duration of navy repairs
 - SYTGT081 Al Safira Military Research Centre destruction would significantly hamper military research including biological weapons
 - SYTGT088 Syrian Intelligence Office Jirah destruction reduces Syrian ability to coordinate air strikes on friendly ground forces
 - SYTGT119 Al Assad Ammo Storage impact unknown one of three known ammo storage sites
 - SYTGT075 1st Corps Army Base destruction would reduce morale of 1st Corps units
 - Ammo factories totalling 67% of Syrian MLRS production capacity (2 locations), 50% of unguided bomb and 100% of PGM production capacity (1 location and 100% of AAA/small-arms ammo production capacity (1 location)
 - Vehicle factories totalling 100% of current truck production capacity (1 location), 40% of current BMP/BTR/Scud TEL production capacity (1 location), and final assembly of MiG-21 or MiG-23 (1 location)
 - This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

 Chemical weapons production facility